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Abstract 
As discussions around the revision of MiFID are heating up, this paper tries to set a new regulatory 
and institutional framework for multilateral and bilateral execution mechanisms of complex financial 
instruments, such as over-the-counter derivatives and fixed income products. The author argues that 
the current MiFID framework is equipped to capture a great deal of multilateral derivatives and fixed 
income  trading,  but  the  Directive  fails  to  provide  a  complete  definition  of  bilateral  execution 
mechanisms and has narrowed it to mainly own account trading (e.g. systematic internaliser).  
A  key  proposal  of  this  paper  is  to  consider  own  account  trading,  agency  trades  (discretionary 
matching) and principal trading as pure bilateral execution services to be classified under a broader 
definition of systematic internaliser (with revised obligations), subject then to the application of 
conduct of business rules (e.g. conflicts of interests management procedures) and a best execution 
regime. MTF would then be adapted to explicitly state that multilateral systems are not just those 
bringing together multiple interests from third parties, but those systems bringing together interests 
through ‘non-discretionary’ services, vis-à-vis membership, admission of products to trading, and 
matching of interests. Finally, despite the claim that OTF and SEF would be equivalent categories, 
US and EU regulators are defining diverging regulations for these venues. There are at least four 
important areas in which the SEF definitions do not match the proposed EU rules for OTFs.  
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Setting the Institutional and Regulatory 
Framework for Trading Platforms: 
Does the MiFID definition of OTF make sense?  
ECMI Research Report No. 8/April 2012 
Diego Valiante
 
n October 2011, the European Commission released legislative proposals for the revision of 
the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive. It is an extensive review of MiFID I,
1 even 
though core principles such as liberalisation of investment services remain  untouched. Both 
regulators and industry have  largely recognised the success of MiFID I in opening markets and 
bringing down trading costs. However, regulatory gaps in MiFID I and the implications of the 
financial crisis and G-20 commitments have led regulators to reconsider some key aspects of the 
original framework Directive.  
A  crucial element  of MiFID II is the new trading venue category  called  ‘organised  trading 
facilities’ (OTFs), and claimed as the equivalent of the US swap execution facility (SEF). The 
introduction  of  a  new  category  of  trading  venue  would  be  also  in  line  with  the  early  G-20 
commitment, stating that 
“All standardised OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading 
platforms, where appropriate, [...] by end-2012 at the latest.” (G-20 Toronto Summit Declaration, 
June 26-27 2010). 
A new legal definition of trading venue in Europe aims at capturing all hybrid bespoke or manual 
(semi-automated) mechanisms that allow trading of derivatives and other financial instruments, 
typically  those  ‘over-the-counter’.  In  particular,  the  legal  venue  definition  would  capture  all 
mechanisms  that  allow  dealers  and  clients  to  get  into  complex  and  customised  derivative 
transactions  on  an  electronic  or  voice-based  platform.  The  notional  size  of  OTC  derivatives 
contracts was $708 trillion at the end of June 2011 (BIS Statistics). ISDA (2012) estimates that 
30% of swap contracts (almost $135 trillion out of $450 trillion) would be eligible for organised 
electronic trading, while the remaining part will be executed through bilateral mechanisms. So far, 
only 10% of OTC swaps is traded on electronic platforms, and roughly 6% on multilateral venues 
(multi-dealer or inter-dealer platforms). The margin for additional growth of multilateral electronic 
trading is thus very big. 
Setting the framework 
Before getting into the merits of key definitions, the paper puts the discussion in a more dogmatic 
framework. Market settings and trading financial instruments are at the core of MiFID, which 
attempts to capture the two broad categories that define trading of financial instruments: bilateral 
and multilateral market settings.  
Multilateral markets are those settings whereby a market operator or an investment firm operate as 
riskless counterparty that brings together on a systematic basis all sorts of buying and selling 
                                                       
 Diego Valiante, PhD, is Head of Research at ECMI and Research Fellow, CEPS. 
1 The MiFID II level 1 Directive and Regulation have 147 articles, while MiFID I has made incredible 
changes with a level 1 regulatory framework of only 73 articles based on principle. The current MiFID II 
will require a high number of implementing measures, in particular additional regulation will be delegated to 
the Commission for the definition of more technical aspects (Rec. 106, MiFID II). 
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interests, i.e. the operator/firm does not apply discretion on how orders are matched (so after 
receiving the order; ex post), as well as it does not apply discretion on whom should be allowed to 
access the platform and what kind of products should be admitted to trading.
2 A set of rules and 
criteria is defined ex ante to allow non-discriminatory access and fulfil the neutral role of a trading 
venue operator. As a result, the platform does not apply discretion ex-ante/ex-post, neither does it 
match against proprietary capital (as riskless counterparty).  As a consequence, ‘multilateral’ does 
not simply mean bringing together ‘multiple’ buying and selling interests, otherwise a systematic 
internaliser could be considered as such, even though it does so by discretionarily matching these 
interests against proprietary capital. 
A  venue  is  a  pure  ‘multilateral’ and ‘neutral’  organised  infrastructure if  no discretionary  rule 
applies in any of the three aspects below (in line with Recital 6 MiFIR, old recital 6 MiFID): 
1.  Matching of orders (system; manual or electronic); 
2.  Admission to trading (products); and 
3.  Access to the platform (membership). 
These three tasks must be in line with non-discretionary criteria to categorise the platform as a 
‘multilateral’ venue. The concept of ‘neutrality’ of the platform operator, in effect, is intertwined 
with its inability to discretionarily influence:  
  The supply of buying/selling interests (membership); 
  The object of the transaction (product); and   
  The interaction among these interests (matching).  
Criteria for products, matching system – whether they are run through an electronic or manual 
(voice) matching system – and membership must be defined ex ante with transparent criteria and 
not on a case-by-case basis. The venue should then act as a riskless counterparty that does not deal 
on own account on the trading venue. The regulatory seal would then make sure that obligations 
(transparency, conduct and surveillance mechanisms) are uniformly applied, whether the venue is 
legally classified as regulated market (RM) or multilateral trading facility (MTF) under MiFID or 
run by a market operator or an investment firm (e.g., dealer)
3. It is therefore irrelevant whether the 
matching is done through electronic or manual (voice) systems,
4 as long as the intermediary acts as 
a riskless counterparty and following the non-discretionary criteria.  
If at least one of these three aspects that qualify a venue as multilateral/neutral infrastructure is not 
met, the type of execution should be then considered ‘bilateral’. Bilateral trading under MiFID is 
only classified through a narrow definition of systematic internaliser – which refers to systematic 
matching of client orders against own capital (‘own account’ trading) – and by a loosen definition 
of over-the-counter trading – when dealing on a non-systematic basis with wholesale orders above 
the standard  market  size
5. Both of them mainly apply to equity trading, which leaves MiFID 
                                                       
2 MiFID defines ‘multilateral’ as a ‘riskless counterparty’, which runs a ‘system’ for matching orders (not 
necessarily electronic) without discretion (Rec. 6, MiFID). 
3 As a result, the new venue categorisation (see next section) would not meet one of the three requirements 
above to be considered as ‘multilateral’ execution venue. 
4 Multilateral venues can run matching systems based on voice communication and still be able to provide 
non-discretionary services. It depends on the ability of the platform operator to connect multiple dealers and 
build a system that can provide ex ante information to clients on how the deal will be matched, rather than 
executing the best deal on his/her behalf. In the latter case, the nature of the transaction would then become 
bilateral.  
5 MiFID I then leaves ambiguous terminology or sets too rigid definitions for ‘systematic’, ‘wholesale’, and 
‘standard market size’. Overall, its implementation has left a grey list of activities (such as those of broker-
dealer crossing networks; Valiante, 2011) that are currently not classified under MiFID, which does  not SETTING THE INSTITUTIONAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR TRADING PLATFORMS | 3 
       
unequipped to capture and classify all bilateral execution systems currently available in non-equity 
markets. 
In effect, market settings for trading of financial instruments may go from pure bilateral face-to-
face transactions to more sophisticated auction models based on order books or batch auctions with 
highly standardised financial instruments (see Figure 1). The factor that shapes the market setting 
and  sets  an  efficient  price  formation  mechanism  is  liquidity.  As  the  trading  of  the  financial 
instruments becomes more widespread in terms of type of buying and selling interests and frequent 
(so  more  liquid),  the  execution  system  naturally  evolves  from  a  pure  bilateral  setting  to  a 
multilateral one, where a more neutral infrastructure (which may not apply ‘discretion’) can cope 
with high volumes and buyers and sellers’ specificities through a more complex matching. By 
contrast, if liquidity shrinks due to the complexity of the financial instruments, the pricing of 
instruments  relies  on  indications  of  interests  rather  than  firm  binding  quotes.  Therefore,  the 
volatility of liquidity in some markets affects the structure of the market itself. As liquidity may 
become  more  volatile,  multilateral  (whether  based  on  firm  or  indicative  pricing)  and  bilateral 
market settings should thus be able to interact among each other, and so regulation should have 
some sort of flexibility in the interaction of legally classified trading venues and the application of 
rigid legal definitions. Bilateral and multilateral (with firm or indicative pricing) settings, in effect, 
give the possibility to find liquidity for less standardised and illiquid products such as complex 
fixed income products and OTC derivatives. 
Figure 1. Market settings and MiFID 
 
Source: Author. 
Multilateral settings  are  largely  venues  offering  ‘matching’  services  opposed to  ‘execution  on 
behalf’ services, which fit bilateral settings.
6 Liquidity in multilateral settings allows investors to 
                                                                                                                                                                
necessarily mean that they are unreported (post-trade transparency requirements typically apply to them as 
well). 
6 Under MiFID I, ‘matching services’ would fall under operation of MTF, while bilateral settings would be 
those related to ‘execution of orders on behalf of clients’ or ‘dealing on own account’ (Annex I, Section A, 
MiFID I). 4 | DIEGO VALIANTE 
‘discover’ prices themselves, as counterparties would be able to commit to a firm quote, so buying 
and selling interests meet in an ex-ante transparent venue
7 with no interference on how these 
interests  would  interact,  minimising  infrastructure’s  conflicts  between  different  functions. 
‘Execution on behalf’ services, instead, allow a third-party, on the basis of a fiduciary relationship 
with the buyer or the seller to perform the transaction on his/her behalf. As a result, ‘execution on 
behalf’ services allow an intermediary to de facto substitute the buyer/seller in his/her decision, 
which legally remains his/her own (see graph below). An execution system based on execution on 
behalf services (such as a brokerage system) cannot be considered as a multilateral platform, as 
long  as  its  matching  services  are  discretionary  (so  it  does  not  meet  one  of  the  three 
abovementioned factors that qualify non-discretionary services). The broker acts on the basis of a 
mandate that ultimately makes the transaction a bilateral agreement between two counterparties. 
Not all potential counterparties to the deal – that in a multilateral setting the party looking for a 
deal would have known and been able to reach ex ante (platform members) – will be able in a 
bilateral setting to interact with the other party and put those interested in the deal in competition 
to provide better terms. As a result, party A (see below) would get a deal that is the result of a 
unilateral search of the operator, rather than an interaction between party A’s interest and all 
potential parties that would be willing to compete for that deal by offering better terms. 
Figure 2. Bilateral versus multilateral execution 
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Over-the-counter derivatives financial instruments are mostly traded in a bilateral fashion through 
private  transactions,  pure  bilateral  execution  systems  (voice  single  dealer  platforms)  or  on 
sophisticated  execution  systems  that  can  be  a  combination  of  bilateral  (voice  single  dealer 
platforms)  and  multilateral  execution  services  (such  as  multi-dealer  or  dealer-to-client  trading 
platforms) through voice and electronic trading. In effect, some of these markets may be subject to 
fast-changing  market  liquidity  conditions,  therefore  –  when  the  market  becomes  less  liquid  – 
                                                       
7 Post-trade transparency, instead, applies to all transactions done by investment firms, which involve shares 
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investors  may  start  to  switch  from  electronic  to  voice,  asking  the  broker/dealer  to  submit  an 
indication of interest and match his/her interest with someone else’s interest, or in other cases even 
to ‘look for a deal’ on his/her behalf (see Figure 3). Overall, as liquidity dries up, quotes naturally 
become less firm and more subject to oscillations. 
Figure 3. Electronic vs voice execution with volatility on Euro IRS market 
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Source: ICAP.
8  
The structure could then change from a multilateral to a bilateral execution venue, with all its 
implication in terms of conflicts of interest procedures and management. In effect, hybrid systems 
allow matching of indicative quotes on a system that can be designed as multilateral, in line with 
the requirements described above. However, once interests are matched, the final execution of the 
trade may need the intervention of a broker to get the transaction executed (see Figure 4). The 
broker will interpose itself to the direct negotiation of terms among parties, playing a crucial 
function to get the deal done. As a consequence, the nature of this relationship cannot be defined 
as multilateral anymore, as the broker directly or indirectly (by discretionarily asking the involved 
parties to offer specific terms) shapes the final terms of the deal with its intervention on how 
interests would interact to finalise the execution of the trade. 
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Figure 4. Hybrid systems 
 
Source: Author. 
In terms of matching mechanisms, the simple switch to voice would not necessarily mean a change 
in the nature of the transaction from a multilateral to a bilateral one. The switch of execution 
models  instead  happens  when  the  operator,  using  an  implicit  or  explicit  mandate,  takes  over 
investor’s choice and search for a deal or finalise the terms of the deal that it may consider the best 
available for its client on the basis of its reach and ‘perception’ of the market (not on the basis of 
the potential reach and size of the market for that financial instrument). This situation affects many 
complex  derivatives  and  fixed  income  products,  but  the  evolution  of trading  technologies  are 
sensibly reducing the areas in which clients would need to leave the deal in the operator’s hands. A 
regulatory framework that, on the one side, would be able to offer enough flexibility to capture 
bilateral  execution  systems  (as  the  one  illustrated  in  Figure  4)  and  make  them  available  to 
investors, and, on the other side, would be able to boost market developments that will allow an 
ever-growing number of products to be traded in fully-transparent multilateral execution venues 
would  be  certainly  beneficial  for  the  market  as  a  whole.  Nevertheless,  bilateral  execution 
mechanisms  will  always  be  part of the  market,  as  investors  need to fulfil  diverse  needs  with 
different levels of available information. 
As a result, the execution system is mostly affected by the level of liquidity of the underlying 
instrument.  For  instance,  with  a  high  number  of  active  participants  and  trades,  standardised 
products
9 and transactions, a limit order book (LOB) would most likely be the prevailing execution 
system  (IOSCO,  2011).  The  liquidity  conditions  that  determine  the  prevailing  execution 
mechanism rely on three elements: time (turnover speed, i.e. the time needed to turnover a position 
                                                       
9 There is no formal definition of standardisation officially introduced into regulation. CESR (2010), also on 
the basis of my earlier paper (Valiante, 2010), has proposed a definition that relies on three key elements of 
standardisation: legal (contracts); process (infrastructure); product (economic terms). SETTING THE INSTITUTIONAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR TRADING PLATFORMS | 7 
       
in the market, which reflect the responsiveness of the counterparty in the market;
10 and frequency 
of trades); price/cost (whether the price is a binding or indicative quote, and level of spreads); size 
(depth of the market, i.e. the ability to absorb high size orders or indication of interests in 
comparison to the average size of orders); and resilience (ability to go back to original trading 
levels after an informational shock affecting the pricing of the product).
11 
Table 1. Liquidity matrix 
  Execution systems 
Liquidity indicators 
Pure bilateral  
(private negotiation) 
Hybrid  
(RFQ/RFM) 
Pure multilateral 
(LOB) 
Turnover  Low  Medium  High 
Frequency of trades  Low  Low/Medium  High 
Resilience to shock  High  Medium  Medium/Low 
Spread  High  Medium/High  Low 
Quote firmness  Low  Low/Medium  High 
Depth  High  Medium/High  Low/Medium 
Source: Author. 
Overall, prevailing execution models for over-the-counter derivatives and other complex fixed 
income  markets  are  request-for-quote  systems,  whereby  one  party  requires  a  known  set  of 
counterparties (dealers) a quote or two-way quotes for an instrument with specific characteristics. 
The counterparty would then receive all information about the party requesting the quote to price 
the product correctly. In effect, if a binding quote is not available, the dealer needs to know the 
identity  of  the  other side  to  price  counterparty  risk  in  the  product,  especially  if  the  dealer is 
committing capital to it (as for principal trades). The regulatory framework should be designed to 
allow  the  coexistence  of  these  systems,  knowing  that  markets  cannot  be  always  run  as  pure 
multilateral execution mechanisms. 
The Commission’s proposal and current MiFID text 
For trading of OTC derivatives and some fixed income products bilateral execution systems are 
complementary to multilateral ones and cannot be outlawed. There is no way to assess perspective 
liquidity with precision, but execution can be ex ante classified as bilateral or multilateral. There is 
therefore a need to modify the current MiFID text to deal with market developments. Non-equity 
markets have a more complex market structure and to deal with the peculiar market structure of 
products  that  will  fall  under  the  trading  obligation  (Rec.  22-23,  and  art.  26-27,  MiFIR),  the 
Commission’s  proposal  does  not  amend  MiFID  current  venues  for  bilateral  and  multilateral 
execution but it introduces a new venue that would only capture part of the bilateral execution 
systems currently available (pure execution on behalf services, which does not include trading on 
own account and principal trading). It then elevates this definition to the level of regulated markets 
and multilateral trading facilities, which are pure multilateral execution systems, so functionally 
different (on a paradoxical claim to level the playing field, even if they are not playing the same 
                                                       
10 For complex OTC derivative products this time is sensibly lower as they need to price the counterparty 
and offer a quote. 
11 The proposed definition takes some elements from the proposed definition of liquidity for order books by 
Kyle (1985). 8 | DIEGO VALIANTE 
game). More precisely, the explanatory memorandum clarifies that “while both the rules on access 
and execution methodology of an OTF have to be transparent and clear, they allow the operator to 
perform a service to clients which is qualitatively if not functionally different from the services 
provided by regulated markets and MTFs to their members and participants” (p. 6, MiFID II). 
More specifically, the Commission proposes: 
‘Organised  trading  facility  (OTF)’  means  any  system  or  facility,  which  is  not  a 
regulated market or MTF, operated by an investment firm or a market operator, in 
which multiple third-party buying and selling interests in financial instruments are 
able to interact in the system in a way that results in a contract in accordance with 
the provisions of Title II of Directive [new MiFID] (Art.2.7, MiFIR). 
Once again, the new MiFID does not try to capture all bilateral trading systems, but it suggests a 
residual category (in addition to the OTC residual category, Rec. 18, MiFIR
12) that takes into 
account only one tiny form of bilateral trading (discretionary matching). In effect, OTF will not be 
able to match orders against own capital. The text clarifies that only SIs would be able to match 
against own capital. It does not consider principal trading either. Nevertheless, the proposa l does 
not allow an SI to interact with an OTF, which further reduces the range of action of the OTF. In 
the end, the effectiveness of this categorisation becomes very minimal, but at the same time its 
boundaries are so blurred that could become a mean to categorise business models that resemble a 
pure bilateral transaction, but that for marketing purposes gets a better advertisement as a platform 
that would be elevated by regulation as similar to neutral infrastructures, such as multilateral 
trading facilities and regulated markets. The current definition adds confusion to an already 
complex venue classification under MiFID. The recent draft report of the European Parliament (so 
called, ‘Ferber Report’; EP, 2012) does not address the missed classification of bilateral execution 
systems and confirms the content of the old MiFID definition of bilateral trading as ‘own account 
trading’. ‘Multilateral’, instead, only refers to a system that brings together multiple buying and 
selling interests.  
An alternative view of the topic 
Current  multilateral  trading  facilities  (MTF)  under  MiFID  can  cope  with  most  of  derivatives 
organised trading. In effect, the current MTF definition defines non-discretionary matching of 
‘buying and selling interests’ “to be understood in a broad sense [...]” including “[...] orders, 
quotes and indications of interest” (Rec. 6, MiFID). As a result, the definition suits most of the 
request-for-quote (RFQ) or request-for-market (RFM) models currently available on the market to 
deal with ‘episodic market’. The operator in these markets is a sort of ‘facilitator’, which allow 
matching  of  complex  buying  and  selling  interests,  keeping  its  neutrality  by  providing  non-
discretionary services (see Figure 1). RFQ and RFM models help to solve strong asymmetries of 
sizes and economic terms among counterparties and can be modelled as multilateral execution 
mechanisms, as long as the market can interact with bilateral mechanisms if needed. This paper 
thus formulates two options that would best suit the structure of MiFID and the nature of European 
markets.  
Option 1 
Instead  of  introducing  a  new  category  designed  on  a  rather  partial  view  of  the  market,  an 
alternative would be to amend current definitions under MiFID to qualify better multilateral and 
bilateral  execution  systems.  RFQ  and  RFM  models  can  be  run  through  multilateral/non-
discretionary platforms (as defined above) whether matching is done electronically or manually 
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(voice). Current MiFID text could be amended to define non-discretionary rules (Rec. 6, MiFID) 
as  above,  i.e.  if  they  meet  the  three  requirements  (membership,  product  and  matching). 
Additionally, the systematic internaliser definition, a legal trading venue (art. 2.8 Reg 1287/2006), 
should be expanded (art. 4.1(7), MiFID) to include systematic and material (as defined by Reg. 
1287/2006) own account trading, pure discretionary matching (agency trades) and principal trading 
(pure brokerage services) done by the operator, which would then qualify as bilateral execution 
system. This concept of ‘discretionary’ does not clash with the non-discretionary requirement of 
art. 21.1(a) Reg. 1287/2006, as CESR clarified that “a firm should always use discretion when 
deciding whether or not to execute a client order against its own account as the firm has to meet 
best execution obligations; [...] the non-discretionary element of a SI is a relevant component of 
the definition to avoid including ad hoc transactions that would not be systematic” (CESR, 2010; 
p. 13-14). Perhaps, regulators would need to directly clarify what would not be considered as 
‘systematic’,  by  first  saying  that  non-discretionary  rules  for  SI  do  not  refer  to  the  execution 
mechanism but to the commercial policy and access to the venue (as set by art.27(5), MiFID). The 
article (art. 21.1(a), Reg. 1287/2006) could then be amended as ‘non-discretionary access rule’, 
clearly referring to the access rather than the execution system. The text would then need to state 
that  SI  would  apply  conduct  of  business  rules  (CoB;  e.g.  conflicts  of  interest  rules)  and  best 
execution (if execution on behalf). Additional surveillance requirements may be designed for the 
platform. The application of CoB rules does not make up for the use of discretionary services, but 
it reduces the conflicts between different functions of the operator. Therefore, even if an OTF 
applies CoB and best execution rules, these would not be enough to consider this platform as 
‘multilateral’ and ‘neutral. And vice versa, if a platform deals only with eligible counterparties 
(ECP), so it does not apply best execution requirements, this does not change the bilateral nature of 
the service provided. The ECP regime is an exception to the application of fiduciary duties (which 
do not apply) that does not change the fact that the service is based on a fiduciary relationship, 
with all related implications for price formation mechanisms. 
In relation to the provision of quotes by the operator, the obligation to provide firm quotes (art. 27, 
MiFID)  should  only  apply  to  equities,  while  for  non-equities  the  obligation  could  entail  the 
provision of indicative quotes or to provide firm quotes when the transaction would fall under the 
pre-trade transparency obligation, under the new transparency regime based on the nature of the 
instruments.  To  avoid  risks  of  market  manipulations  with  indicative  pricing  mechanisms,  an 
obligation to execute trades in the matched spread (interest) should be added to the legislative text. 
Furthermore, it should be clearly stated that a SI could interact with a MTF run by the same or a 
different  operator.  Ownership  restrictions to  the  SI  operator  over  the MTF  platform  could  be 
introduced. If the SI brings together third-party orders
13 it must be classified as MTF. As a result, 
this would define clear boundaries of bilateral execution systems, which are now missing in 
MiFID. Non-systematic wholesale transactions will remain exempted under the OTC conditions 
set by the Directive (Rec. 53, MiFID; now Rec. 18, MiFIR). 
Option 2 
An  alternative  but  still  incomplete  option  would  be  to  amend  the  current  OTF  definition  by 
allowing  interaction  with SI  and  allowing  principal  trade of the  operator,  as  long  as  a  viable 
classification and separation of principal trading from own account trading would be possible. In 
effect, principal trading positions may be rolled over and become own account trading, so violating 
a key requirement of this platform. Therefore, if the operator decides to roll over a principal 
                                                       
13 Principal trades done by the SI operator should be classified as client orders, while principal trades in 
which the operator is not involved should not be allowed on a SI. If it happens, they would need to register a 
MTF and direct that specific business on that platform. 10 | DIEGO VALIANTE 
trading position as ‘own account’, it would need to disclose it and complete it outside of the 
platform. It could be done on a SI if interaction between OTF and SI would be permitted. In any 
case, the exclusion of principal trading from the OTF definition hampers the possibility for this 
platform  to  become  execution  venue  for  a  vast  range  of  OTC  derivatives  transactions.  More 
precisely, a narrow definition would potentially outlaw systematic principal trading, as it would 
not be captured by any of the definition proposed by the MiFID review. 
This option however would not help to clarify the distinction between bilateral and multilateral by 
keeping the original confusion, and whether the OTF would be able to run both execution systems. 
Even if it would not be allowed to run both systems, the separation of functions between an OTF 
and an SI would still be difficult to be drawn, in particular if OTFs would be allowed to interact 
with a SI or to trade on own account or run principle matching. 
Differences with the US Swap Execution Facility (SEF) 
Important differences emerge among the new OTF category and the current competing proposals 
formulated  in  the  United  States  by  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  (SEC)  and  the 
Commodity Future Trading Commission (CFTC). It should be clarified beforehand that the US 
have a limited regulatory framework for trading of over-the-counter derivatives and in particular 
for the operation of multilateral versus bilateral execution systems, which are usually regulated by 
asset class. As a consequence, the alternative trading system (ATS) definition, which captures 
alternative multilateral execution systems, only applies to equities. In Europe, instead, the MTF 
definition  applies  to  all  financial  instruments  and  several  platforms  trading  fixed  income  and 
standardised derivatives are currently registered as MTF. Therefore, the discussion in the US is 
much more focused on creating a new category able to capture multilateral execution systems and 
own  account  trading  for  standardised  fixed  income  products  (and  in  particular,  derivatives
14). 
Therefore, a list of divergences between the SEF and OTF definitions emerges (see table below). 
First, the US regulators propose to put a cap on a swap dealer’s ownership of the infrastructure 
(whether the operator or not). The CFTC proposes a 10% stake maximum, while the SEC sticks to 
the original Dodd-Frank proposal of 20% threshold (CFTC, 2011, p. 1217; SEC, 2011, p. 132). 
MiFID proposals do not put a cap on the ownership of the infrastructure.  
Second,  the  SEF  definitions  allow  own  account  trading  of  the  operator  to  interact  with  the 
operation of the infrastructure. The Commission’s proposal, instead, explicitly prohibits the OTF 
operator to have own account activities or even interact with systematic internalisers (Rec. 8, 
MiFIR). 
Third, SEF definitions would not allow discretionary matching, but voice intermediation will be 
allowed only if used as a mean of communication for the electronic matching (CFTC 2011, p. 
1221) or for trading of block trades. As explained above, at the core of the Commission’s proposal 
discretionary matching would be the key feature of an OTF, which would partially capture hybrid 
systems based on voice brokerage services. 
Fourth, SEF definitions call for an obligation to have a minimum number of active participants that 
will be dealing with a request for quote or other buying/selling interest. The OTF category does 
not contemplate so and it actually leaves full discretion to the operator/broker, under its mandate 
and under a loosen definition of best execution, the decision to survey the whole or a tiny part of 
the market to get an interest that would provide the ‘best’ available deal for the client. 
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Table 2. Key differences US-EU proposals 
  US  MiFID I  Commission’s proposal  Option 1 
  SEF 
(SEC) 
SEF 
(CFTC) 
MTF 
SI 
(own account 
only) 
MTF  OTF 
SI 
(own account 
only) 
MTF 
SI 
(brokerag
e services) 
Discretion 
Membership  NO  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  YES  NO  YES 
Products  NO  NO  NO 
YES  
(equities 
only) 
NO  NO 
YES 
(equities 
only) 
NO  YES 
Matching 
(e.g. 
bilateral 
voice) 
NO  NO  NO  YES  NO  YES  YES  NO  YES 
Pre-trade transparency  YES  YES 
Depends 
on 
instrument 
Depends on 
instrument 
Depends 
on 
instrument 
Depends 
on 
instrument 
Depends on 
instrument 
Depends 
on 
instrument 
Depends 
on 
instrument 
Binding quotes only  
NO 
(one type 
or both) 
NO 
(both) 
NO 
YES 
(for liquid 
shares) 
NO  NO 
YES 
(for liquid 
shares) 
NO  NO 
Ownership restrictions 
YES 
(20%) 
YES 
(10%) 
NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
Own account trading  NO  YES  NO 
YES 
(equities) 
NO  NO 
YES 
(equities) 
NO  YES 
Limit on number of 
participants 
YES (at 
least one) 
YES 
(min. 5)  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
Source: Author. 12 | DIEGO VALIANTE 
Such strong divergences reflect somehow a different regulatory background and supervisory 
culture, the US one typically more focused on prescriptive regulation and the European one that 
was used to be, at least before the crisis, much more focused on regulating different functions 
rather than how the service or product should be ultimately delivered. The MiFID framework 
for market (infra)structure, despite all its pitfalls, has proved once again to be ahead of what 
even its drafter had originally thought. In effect, with some adjustments (option 1), it can set a 
framework that would provide a clear and sound venue classification. However, divergences of 
approach between Europe and the US will still remain. For instance, the limit to the ownership 
of the infrastructure may somehow reflect the different approach on how to deal with conflicts 
of interest, which in Europe has been historically focused on how to get the management of 
conflicts right rather than trying to avoid that the conflict would emerge ex ante. 
Conclusions 
Discussions around the revision of MiFID are heating up and one of the key topics on the desk 
of  regulators  is  the  current  trading  venue  classification  and  its  flexibility  to  catch  up  with 
complex market developments in the trading of ‘standardised’ over-the-counter derivatives.  
Current MiFID framework is currently equipped to capture a great deal of derivatives trading (at 
least the one based on multilateral execution systems).
15 However, the Directive did fail in 
understanding correctly how bilateral execution systems work and the implications of limiting 
its legal classification to a narrow definition of systematic internalisation. As a result, the 
attention of regulators should be more on ensuring a proper regulatory framework for bilatera l 
execution systems, rather than pretending that a system based on discretionary matching could 
be considered multilateral and put on the same level than a MTF or a regulated market. This 
risks  creating  additional confusion  in  an already complex set of mar ket infrastructures and 
execution mechanisms. 
The key proposal of this paper is to consider own account trading, discretionary matching and 
principal trading as parts of the same set of core brokerage services to be classified as bilateral 
execution  systems  under  a  broader  definition  of  systematic  internaliser  (with  revised 
obligations), subject then to the application of conduct of business rules (e.g. conflicts of 
interests management procedures) and a best execution regime. MTF would then be adapted to 
explicitly state that multilateral systems are not just those bringing together multiple interests 
from  third  parties,  but  those  bringing  together  these  interests  through  ‘non-discretionary’ 
services, as described above, whether or not the actual matching system is electronic or manual 
(voice).  
Finally,  despite  convergence  on  high-level  objectives,  US  and  EU  regulators  are  following 
diverging paths in defining the regulatory framework respectively for SEF and OTF. There are 
at least four important areas in which the SEF definitions do not match up with the proposed 
rules  for  OTFs.  Most  importantly,  proposed  SEF  definitions  would  not  allow  discretionary 
matching services and so single dealer voice brokerage services, which are a core part of the 
parent OTF definition. Big differences with US counterparty can lead to regulatory arbitrages, 
as long as regulation adds up confusion to an already complex market structure. 
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